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T HE communication common carriers and the American Telephone and Tele-
graph Company have been fighting to preserve their monopoly of long-
distance communication facilities. This competition has arisen because new
technology has made it feasible for customers to build and operate their own
communication systems-systems known as private microwave. The rivalry
between private microwave and the communication carriers has erupted in
several cases before the Federal Communications Commission. The Commission,
in disposing of these cases, has evolved a policy that may well determine the
depth of competition in this industry for several decades. A reading of recent
decisions reveals that the Commission has attempted somewhat cautiously to
sponsor more diversity in long-distance communication. The effect of this policy,
however, has been amended by a combination of a lag in the adjudicatory
process of the Commission coupled with the basic structure of the communication
industry. Pending the resolution of these two problems, competition in this
industry will continue to remain, at best, potential.
The locus of rivalry of this industry is the private line or bulk commu-
nication market. This market consists of commercial and government entities
who lease telephone or telegraph size circuits from the common carrier industry.
This class of users possesses unique communication requirements. Generally they
rent telephone size channels from the carriers on an exclusive private lease basis.
These channels may be adapted for either private voice or non-voice service.
A decision by an end user to take his requirements to the common carriers
necessarily carries with it the obligation to lease communication equipment as
well. The tie-in between service and equipment is a policy long invoked by the
carriers, particularly the Bell System. Not only do the carriers refuse to lease
channels without leasing equipment, but they also prohibit the interconnection
of their circuits with customer-owned equipment. In this manner, the leasing
decision by the private-line user holds competitive overtones in the manufactur-
ing of communication apparatus and is particularly relevant for those carriers
who also hold ownership interest in manufacturing affiliates.
Changes in the state of the communication art have yielded to customers
requiring large volumes of communication channels an additional option to
that of taking their requirements from the carriers. Users of these broad-band
circuits are now in the position of exploiting the use of high-frequency radio
techniques known as microwave radio relay.'
t The author wishes to express his appreciation to Mr. Richard Gabel, Professor
George Frick, Professor Joel Dirlam and Mr. Richard Daschbach for their many helpful
comments. They, of course, bear no responsibility for any of the views expressed herein,
* Assistant Professor of Economics, Whittemore School of Business and Economics,
University of New Hampshire.
1. Microwave techniques were innovated on a large scale during World War II by the
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Radio relay stands in marked contrast to conventional wire-line communi-
cation. The latter technique is associated with the acquisition of private-line
rights of way as well as pole lines. Traditionally, these rights of way had con-
ferred the status of public utilities to firms engaged in rendering communication
service to the public. Microwave radio relay, on the other hand, is a method
of transmitting information exempt from both the construction of pole lines as
well as private rights of way. Radio relay transmits messages via a series of
relay towers spaced some thirty miles apart, each repeater amplifying and
transmitting the communication signal.
2
An additional break-through associated with radio relay technique makes
available large quantities of channels that can be used to send a variety of
communication signals. This capacity accords the user a flexibility formerly
unavailable in leasing circuits. Private microwave users, for example, are able
to transmit their telephone messages during the day by their private microwave,
switching to computer operations at night. Moreover, the capacity of private
microwave can be expanded through alterations in the terminal radio equipment.
All in all these inherent economies of radio relay reduce the cost of transmitting
voice or data information and hence have prompted private lease customers to
look into the possibility of owning private microwave. This search has pro-
ceeded in spite of the existence of carrier owned circuits and in spite of the
fact that the carriers themselves had introduced microwave into their own
communication plant.
The opposing interests of private microwave and the common carriers have
clashed in a series of adversary proceedings before the Federal Communications
Commission. These proceedings have turned on the question of four rather
complex but interrelated issues. They include the size of the frequency spectrum,
cost structure of the common carriers, the pricing decisions of the carriers, and
the feasibility of competition in the manufacture of communication equipment.
II. THE IssuEs
Inasmuch as private microwave operates on bands of radio frequency, the
supply and hence availability of this resource is crucial to its existence. The
first issue, that of frequency adequacy, transcends the related problems of
cost or pricing. The allocation of bands of the radio spectrum falls under the
jurisdiction of the FCC. Its view of the supply relative to existing and potential
Army Signal Corps. See Office of the Chief Military History, Dep't of the Army, United
States Army in World War II-The Technical Services, the Signal Corp, the Test, December
1941 to July 1943, 371-72 (1947).
2. Trienens, Current Problems in the Pricing of Telephone Services to Meet Competi-
tion, 72 Pub. Util. Fort. 117 (1963): "No longer is a right of way necessary to provide inter-
city transference of messages. A plot of ground every 30 miles or so for a microwave relay
tower is all that is needed to construct a microwave system. As a result, any industry can
physically construct a private intercity communications system and such private systems are
no longer confined to industry such as railroads and pipelines having their own rights of
way. The only problem is to obtain the necessary license for use of microwave frequency."
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use governs the viability of competition in the volume communication market.
If the Commission, for example, regards the spectrum as a finite and limited
resource, then its utilization would be restricted to the common carrier industry
alone. If, on the other hand, the Commission regards the number of microwave
frequency bands as more than adequate, then use of the spectrum will be
liberalized beyond the occupancy of the common carriers. Thus spectrum supply
governs spectrum rationing, which in turn determines the market entry of
private microwave.
The cost structure of the common carrier industry, a second issue, is
somewhat removed from the frequency resource problem. By the nature of
the industry the rendition of communication messages necessarily requires
heavy investments in telephone plant and equipment. The greater number
of long-distance subscribers tends to yield cost economies because the over-
head cost of the carrier is shared by each customer. Under these conditions, is
competition feasible in this industry, or does it fall within the status of a "natural
monopoly?"
A third issue confronting the FCC has been the problem of communication
tariffs. What effect would private microwave have upon the level of communica-
tion tariffs-would these tariffs tend to rise or would they fall? Moreover, if
the Commission decided to promote competition in the bulk communication
market, would it, by the same token, permit the carriers to engage in competitive
pricing in order to hold their customers to the lease option?
Finally, the Commission was impelled to deal with the market structure
of the common carrier industry. The two major carriers, the General Telephone
System and the American Telephone and Telegraph System are vertically
integrated. As holding companies they control the ownership of operating
carriers as well as hold ownership interest in manufacturers of communication
equipment.3 Is this relationship justified by the economies of size or scale?
And if so, would not a policy promoting the entry of independent manufacturers
of microwave equipment tend to rescind the lower cost inherent in the utility-
manufacturer relationship? In response to these four issues the carrier industry
and sponsors of private microwave offered diverse policy recommendations to
the FCC.
3. Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Investigation on the Commission's own motion into the
rates, tolls, rules, charges, operations, practices, contracts, service and facilities of the Pacific
Tel. and Tel. Co., Decis. No. 67369 in Case No. 7409 (filed July 26, 1962) 33: "Western is by
far the largest manufacturer, installer, and procurer of telephone equipment in the United
States, accounting for 80% or more of the total business. Respondent, like other Bell System
companies (Pacific Telephone and Telegraph) makes most of its purchases from or through
Western under a standard supply contract. The prices under this contract are fixed by
Western." See United States v. Gen. Tel. & Electronics Corp., Civ. 1912 (S.D.N.Y. June 19,
1964) 5: "The manufacturing facilities of the General System encompass at least 46 manu-
facturing plants and 38 laboratories in the United States as well as affiliated sales companies.
The major domestic manufacturing facilities include Automatic Electric Company, Lenkirk
Electric Company, Inc., and Sylvania Electric Products, Inc. Also Leich Electric Company."
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III. ALTERNATIVES TO POLICY
Restriction of Private Microwave
The common carrier industry opposed the market entry of customer-owned
private microwave. This opposition was epitomized by their attitude regarding
the licensing of frequencies in the microwave region of the radio spectrum. Prior
to 1960, licenses to operate microwave relay systems was limited to the Govern-
ment and to the common carrier industry alone. Both groups were granted
frequencies on a regular basis. A third group, the so-called right-of-way com-
panies (railroads, power utilities and so forth) were issued licenses on a devel-
opmental basis. Permission to operate under these circumstances was granted
with the understanding that the Commission could at any time reallocate these
bands. Beyond these groups, eligibility to exploit the radio spectrum was
prohibited. Manufacturing entities, for example, could not and did not operate
their own radio relay systems. They leased their communication requirements
from the common carriers. Those firms who could not afford the prices of this
service simply went without it.
By the middle 1950's several firms heretofore excluded under the FCC
rule of eligibility applied for frequency licenses to operate their own radio
relay systems. These applications challenged a rationing policy of some ten
years and in fact ignited a controversy designated as Docket No. 11866 or
what has come to be known in the industry as "Above 890 Docket" (in refer-
ence to the frequencies in the microwave region).4 Fundamental to this contro-
versy was the determination of supply and hence the availability of microwave
frequencies for private use.5
The common carriers united in opposing any change in frequency policy.
Viewing customer-operated communication systems as a threat to their own
facilities, they defended the FCC's existing rationing policy by emphasizing
the paucity rather than the abundance of frequency bands in the microwave
region. AT&T, the most articulate member of the industry, submitted that the
public interest resided in the direction of reserving the disputed bands for the
future needs of the common carriers. Bell reminded the FCC of its increasing
4. In the Matter of Allocations of Frequencies in the Bands Above 890 Mc.-Report
and Order 27 F.C.C. 359 (1959). (Hereinafter cited as Above 890-Report.)
5. Testimony of Francis M. Ryan, American Telephone and Telegraph, Docket
No. 11866, 1957, pp. 2218-19: "It has been claimed by some that there is a more than ample
supply of microwave frequency space and that conservation is not necessary. The spectrum
above 890 MC properly utilized has great capacity and is capable of taking care of the
country's needs for radio communications facilities for a long period ahead. It is not in-
exhaustible, however; indeed, unless proper methods of utilization are employed much of its
potential capacity will be lost and shortages of frequency space will be encountered. It is our
belief that it has been due only to the Commission's policy of limiting such authorization to
certain safety and special services which it has judged essential that such chaos has been
avoided."
Above 890-Report, supra note 4, at 388: "The licensing of private systems to compete
with the common carriers would unnecessarily increase the demand for the use of radio
frequency as contrary to the need for conservation in the public interest of the limited
amount of spectrum space available."
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utilization of radio relay techniques for domestic communication. Reservation
of these bands, then, was important to the growth and viability of the carrier
industry and permitting any enterprise to operate radio relay would tend to
degenerate an overcrowded spectrum into one of congestion-a condition that
would impede the obligations of the carriers to conduct their services to the
public.
AT&T also reminded the FCC of the new development of communication
space satellites. Space satellites, essentially microwave repeaters hoisted into
orbit by a rocket, operate most effectively within a limited range of the micro-
wave spectrum-the very bands in fact desired by domestic, private micro-
wave users. These channels are required by the international common carriers
in order to meet the growth requirements in supplying their overseas messages.
Bell, as the carrier rendering overseas voice messages had committed itself to
satellite relay as a new technique in meeting this growth.0 With a vested interest
in adequate frequencies, AT&T was apprehensive that a Commission decision
to liberalize the domestic application of the microwave bands could very well
frustrate a pending and crucial development in overseas communication. In this
regard AT&T also cautioned the FCC against the advisability of sharing these
frequencies between the overseas carriers and domestic microwave. Such sharing
was unworkable in populated North America. 7
The cost economies associated with common carrier operations added im-
pressive support to the continued restriction of private microwave. The carriers
as a capital-intensive industry exhibit a high ratio of overhead cost in relation
to their operating cost. These costs tend to fall as more customers share the
overhead burden. The declining cost nature of carrier operations according to
Bell ruled out the desirability of competition or duplication of communication
facilities. Indeed, the carrier submitted that competition in long-distance cir-
cuits would lead to excess or redundant capacity and economic waste.8 Public
6. "Frequency Needs for Space Communication," Testimony and Exhibits of American
Telephone and Telegraph Company. Testimony of James B. Fisk, FCC Docket No. 11866,
1959, p. 16. "We firmly believe that it is dearly in the public interest at this time for the
Commission to conserve the use of the frequency spectrum and to maintain its earlier policy
of restricting the licensing of private microwave systems, in order to minimize the coming
problems of allocation and interference in meeting frequency needs for space communications.
The problem of space communications revolves around the so-called 'space window' which
is the most feasible range for space satellites relay." See also Tyson, Microwave Communica-
tions: Commercial Possibilities in the '60's, 37 (1961): "Pressure is constantly being placed
on the FCC to have large chunks of frequencies set aside permanently for these uses. (Space
Satellite) On January 18, 1961, the FCC denied AT&T's petition to have 200 MC in the
6425 MC to the 6925 MC band so set aside."
7. In the Matter of Allocation of Frequencies in the Bands Above 890 Mc.-Memo-
randum Opinion and Order, 29 F.C.C. 825, 845 (1960). (Hereinafter cited as Above 890-
Memo.) "AT&T concluded that such sharing was not feasible." See also "Frequency Needs
for Space Communications," Testimony and Exhibits of AT&T, Testimony of Brockway
McMillan, FCC Docket No. 11866, p. 38.
8. "We doubt that our proposed policy of liberalized licensing of private communica-
tions systems will be economically destructive to Western Union or to the other segments of
the common carrier industry because as a general rule, a common carrier should be able to
furnish a given quantum of like communication service more economically and more effi-
ciently than a member of the public who undertakes to do the job himself. This is so because
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policy should be directed to promoting the economies already identified with
a declining cost industry, economies that ruled out market rivalry.
In terms of the third issue-communications tariffs-the carriers justified
a policy of entry restriction based on the carrier pricing system. These rates were
determined on the basis of averaging costs. Some services provided by the indus-
try were supplied over facilities that were high-cost or low-profit routes. Other
services were provided the subscriber over low-cost routes. The final charge
levied to the public was a flat rate derived as an average of both high and low
cost facilities. AT&T submitted that owners of private microwave would be
tempted to provide their own communication requirements over low-cost routes
but then would turn to the carriers and lease requirements over the more ex-
pensive routes. Private microwave, would, in short, pre-empt the high cost routes
in a form of cream skimming which would consign the expensive runs to the
common carriers.9 The net effect of this cream skimming would be to lift the
average cost of communication services for all customers and hence increase the
general price to the consuming public. In the name of lower communication
prices, then, AT&T concluded that the public interest was best served by a
continued policy of restricting use of subscriber-owned radio systems.
Finally, would not a policy promoting private microwave flaunt the
economies associated with the common ownership of both equipment and a
communications message market? Both the Bell Telephone System and the
General Telephone System are organized as vertically integrated entities. The
Bell System is not only central in the ownership of long-distance facilities,.
accounting for some 90 per cent of them, but its manufacturing subsidiary,
Western Electric, dominates the equipment market as well. (Western Electric
has accounted for some 80 to 90 per cent of the equipment industry for over
thirty years.)' ° The Associated Bell companies are not required to purchase their
hardware needs from the manufacturing affiliate of their parent company,
AT&T. The fact that they do so is attributed to several considerations. First,
Western Electric's high volume yields lower manufacturing costs and thus is
regarded as the most efficient source for their equipment. (Invariably any
studies submitted by Bell based on price comparisons document Western
Electric as the superior source.)" Second, Western Electric does not incur
of the extent to which the common carrier utilizes its communication plant and operating
personnel to serve in common a large number of users with a variety of services with the
result that the cost per unit of service by the common carrier should be materially below
the cost per unit of service to a private licensee whose facilities are constructed and operated
and maintained to meet the communication requirements of only that licensee." Above 890-
Report, supra note 4, at 852. See also Herber, Telephone Industry Reaction to Microwave
Competition, 70 Pub. Util. Fort. 627 (1962).
9. Above 890-Memo, supra note 7, at 830.
10. Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n Decis. No. 67369, supra note 3, at 33.
11. FCC Report, Investigation of the Telephone Industry in the United States, H.R.
Doc. No. 340, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 311 (1939). See Sheahan, 70 QJ. Econ. 258 (1956):
"Detail cost comparisons by the FCC before the war made it fairly clear that Western was
then the lower cost producer for most equipment." See also Competition versus Regulation
as a Policy Aim for the Telephone Equipment Industry, unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, ch. 6
(Harvard University, 1951).
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advertising or credit costs, both reflecting a lower equipment cost billed to the
associated Bell companies. Moreover, the coordination of equipment design
on one side, and the equipment requirements on the other result in lower costs
yielded by this cooperative effort.
With these economies in mind the decision by the Commission to expand
private microwave would promote competition of independent suppliers who
would be unable to secure the economies of the carrier-manufacturer relation-
ship. This type of rivalry could lead to higher costs in the final service of com-
munication. Moreover, the treatment of competition is dependent upon one's
definition of the relevant market. In this regard, AT&T suggested that the
proper market definition should be broadened so as to embrace the entire field
of electronics, rather than microwave equipment alone.1
2
To summarize the policy recommendation of the common carriers, restric-
tion of customer-owned systems was justified because it tended to conserve a
natural resource, the frequency spectrum; it tended to promote efficiency in
existing use of carrier facilities; it tended to result in lower prices to the con-
sumer for its communication service; and it encouraged inherent economies of
the utility-manufacturing relationship.
Promotion of Private Microwave
If outright rejection of microwave systems operated by private users re-
sided as one policy choice, then unqualified entry stood as its alternative. Argu-
ments supporting liberalization of supporting systems generally took exception
with the position held by the common carriers. On the question of spectrum size,
for example, proponents of private microwave noted that the changes in the
state of the communication art had enlarged the usable part of the microwave
region. The Electronic Industry Association, a trade association of electronic
manufacturers and others, pointed out that some 30 per cent of the region was
currently occupied by radio relay systems. 18 EIA contended that although the
spectrum was not unlimited as a resource, its supply was more than ample
to meet the needs of all users, the carriers and customer-owned systems alike.
"Respondent presented evidence to the effect that a manufacturing division utility could
do a better job manufacturing which would result in lower unit cost for any one of the
operating units of the same utility. In the field of installations, the respondent presented evi-
dence to the effect that a trained installation organization working in close coordination
with the manufacturing division possessing specialized experience and working with a
nation-wide market can do a better job of installing telephone equipment than an organiza-
tion without these advantages." Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n Decis. No. 67369, supra note 3, at 35.
For a recent criticism of Western Electric's comparability studies, see testimony of Richard
Gabel in Western Electric Prices, Western Electric Study in Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co.,
Case No. 494 (D.C. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 1963) 4-5: "The index of price advantage of pur-
chases through Western tells us nothing. The independent supply price is a function of
independent volume, not Western volume. This fact, together with the lack of comparability
pointed out in my previous answer, vitiates the worth of all price comparisons undertaken."
12. Above 890-Report, supra note 4, at 394.
13. Electronic Industries Association (EIA) Exhibit, FCC Docket No. 11866, p. 3:
"Only one-third of this [frequency between 890 MC-13,O00 MC] has been allocated to point
to point use. The balance of this spectrum is allocated for other types of radio service or to
the Federal Government."
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Accordingly, they minimized the issue of frequency congestion and supported a
policy of expanding the eligibility of subscriber-operated systems. Several
organizations joined in endorsing the position of the Electronic Industry Associa-
tion including the National Association of Manufacturers, the National Truck-
ing Association, the American Railroad Association, the National Retail Dry
Goods Association, to mention a few.
Granting that microwave bands were to be liberalized for commercial use,
would not the utilization of these frequencies interfere with communication via
satellite relay? To this query supporters of private microwave submitted that
both the overseas industry as well as domestic private microwave could, with
proper engineering precautions, share and occupy the same frequency channels.
1 4
Thus, communication satellite requirements or frequencies would not be com-
promised by domestic microwave and the employment of both systems would
lead to a more efficient use of the radio spectrum. 15
Proponents of the private microwave option addressed themselves to the
cost problem of common carrier circuits. Would the use of customer owned
channels tend to rescind the decreasing cost economies associated with common
carrier circuits? Potential users of microwave conceded that their "thin routes"
or what they termed their low-capacity microwave systems could hardly compete
with the volume trunk lines of the common carrier industry. 16 Nevertheless,
these bulk users held that they should be accorded an opportunity to choose
between operating their own systems and leasing carrier channels. Furthermore,
they cited cases where common carrier circuits were simply unavailable and
under these circumstances the question of capacity redundance was simply
not an issue.
But more importantly those supporting private microwave testified that
radio relay represented the innovation of a new technology in communication.
In their view, public policy should enhance the application of this new com-
munication art rather than protect conventional wire-line circuits from any
alleged excess capacity. The dual ends of economic growth and innovation
would be served by liberalizing the use of private microwave.
The third issue, the level and derivation of communication tariffs, was
also challenged by those manifesting an interest in owning microwave. The
Bell System had expressed the fear of rampant cream skimming, with customer-
owned channels taking advantage of low-cost routes. These channels would
ultimately increase the price of communication services to the public. Proponents
of private microwave rebutted this argument by asserting that the utilization
of radio relay would reduce their own communication expenditures. This cost
14. Above 890-Memo, supra note 7, at 845: "EIA concluded that such sharing was
feasible if reasonable engineering care was exercised by all concerned."
15. Testimony of D. E. Noble on behalf of Motorola, Inc., FCC Docket No. 11866,
1957, p. 35: "I am convinced that only through free-wheeling, competitive challenging op-
portunities characterized by our free enterprise industrial pattern of the economy will we
achieve the rapidly expanding use of the radio spectrum. ..
16. Id. at 19-20.
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reduction would be translated into lower prices to the consumers of their
manufactured products. The railroads, for example, were particularly vehement
in asserting that their costs could no longer remain competitive if impediments
prevented them from exploiting microwave to the fullest.1 Moreover, these
firms contended that private microwave would enable them to purchase not
less but greater quantities of leased circuits from the common carriers.18 This
expanded purchase would result from cost savings incident to providing their
own communication requirements. And even granting for the moment the
absence of substituting additional leased circuits, suppliers argued that the
economic loss to AT&T's private lease market would be negligible. Motorola,
a microwave equipment supplier, submitted a study suggesting that under the
most pessimistic assumptions less than 3 per cent of AT&T's projected revenues
would be affected. 19
The question of the ability of the carriers to respond to the rivalry of
private microwave was related to the general problem of pricing. In the event
that the Commission liberalized private microwave, could AT&T compete by
established tariffs whose revenues included something less than the full cost
of this service? This question tended to divide and separate two coalitions
who had supported the private microwave cause. Potential customers on one
hand defended any price reduction by the carriers as consonant with the public
interest.20 On the other hand independent suppliers of radio equipment chal-
lenged any carrier tariff that would generate revenues less than the average
cost of supplying the service?'1 They argued that this standard would permit
the carriers to discriminate between their volume and non-volume customers.
Implicit in this charge was the fear that the carriers would be tempted to
indulge in internal subsidization between the competitive private line market
and their non-competitive public message market.
22
Finally, proponents of a liberalized policy pleaded for the opportunity
to engage in the manufacturing of communication apparatus. In this context
they issued a direct challenge to the economies of vertical integration argument
17. FCC Interconnections Hearings Over, 54 Railroad Signaling and Communications
58 (1960). Reference is made to In the Matter of American Telegraph and Telephone Com-
pany Regulations Relating to Connections of Telephone Company Facilities with Certain
Facilities of Customers, FCC Docket No. 12940.
18. 54 Railroad Signaling and Communications 21 (1960).
19. Exhibit No. 142 by Motorola, Inc., "Effect of private microwave installations on
1966 Bell Telephone potential gross revenues," FCC Docket No. 11866, p. 1. See also Above
890-Report, supra note 4, at 389.
20. In the Matter of AT&T Regulations and Charges for TELPAK Services and
Channels, FCC Docket No. 14251, 1961, p. 1. (Hereinafter cited as TELPAK Docket.) TEL-
PAK subscribers who have taken issue with the FCC's tentative decision include the
General Services Administration, the American Trucking Association, Bethlehem Steel, Xerox
Corporation, Olin Matheson Chemical Corporation, National Association of Motor Bus
Owners, Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, Douglas Aircraft Company, United States Steel
Corporation, and Aeronautical Radio, Inc.
21. Proposed Findings and Conclusions of Motorola, Inc., FCC Docket No. 14251,
pp. 97-98. Western Union, although introducing an offering comparable to TELPAK, stands
opposed to AT&T's tariff.
22. Id. at 129.
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propounded by the integrated carriers. As indicated earlier, studies sponsored by
the telephone carriers had asserted that economies of purchasing and buying
reside in favor of the integrated status. These studies documented by cost
savings, compared prices charged by independent suppliers and those charged
by integrated suppliers. Nevertheless, critics have taken issue with the validity
of these studies. 23 They have noted, for example, that the captive suppliers
face a certain and stable market for their products. Moreover, Western Electric
does not include research expenditures in establishing costs competitive with
the independent suppliers' costs. This cost, nevertheless, is incorporated into
the final service charge to the consuming public. Skeptics of the carriers' cost
studies argued that the vast discrepancy in volume between a firm producing
90 per cent of the industry's equipment and a firm producing 5 per cent renders
price comparisons almost meaningless. But, if empirical studies have failed to
conclusively affirm or deny the virtues of vertical integration, then proponents
of private microwave argued that they at least challenge the alleged economies
of the common carriers; for a decision by the consumer to own is a vote for the
non-affiliated rather than the integrated supplier of microwave equipment. In
this sense, the equipment pricing policy of the carrier's affiliates should be
subject to the external judgment of a competitive market.
To summarize, proponents of private microwave suggested that the supply
of frequencies was adequate to justify liberalization, held that private micro-
wave would reduce communication costs, submitted that the impact on user-
operated systems on carrier prices would be minimal, and maintained that
competition in the hardware market was both feasible and desirable.
IV. ACTUAL POLICY
The development of public policy in this field has not been as clear cut
as perhaps suggested by the alternatives recited. Nevertheless, private micro-
wave scored a victory on the frequency licensing issue. In 1959, the FCC
concluded in its Above 890 decision that the supply of frequencies was more
than adequate for all users, or to quote the Commission:
We are of the view that there are now available frequencies above
890 megacycles to take care of the present and reasonably foreseeable
needs of both the common carriers and private microwave users for
point-to-point communication systems (radio relay systems).24
This was a remarkable decision by the FCC, given its historical bias. (The
decision was also encouraged by the Department of Justice.) 25 Not only did
the Commission rule that a sufficient supply of frequencies obviated the neces-
23. "Comparability of manufacturers and suppliers was not established and the reason-
ableness of other company prices, even assuming comparability, was not demonstrated."
Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n Decis. No. 67369, supra note 3, at 35.
24. "The Commission is of the opinion that the sharing of spectrum space is feasible
provided adequate care is taken in the in-system design and in the coordination of day-to-
day changes in circuitry of the sharing systems." Above 890--Memo, supra note 7, at 847.
25. Letter From Department of Justice, FCC Docket No. 11866, March 28, 1957.
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sity of rationing those frequencies, but the FCC concurred with the private
microwave position that radio bands could be shared between domestic and
international users.2 6 Nevertheless, the FCC initiated an inquiry into the
future frequency requirements of communications satellites.27 In another sense
the Commission hedged on its decision by prohibiting private users from band-
ing together and operating a private microwave system jointly.
By sanctioning the competitive entry of private microwave, the FCC ap-
peared to have challenged the cost assumptions advanced by the common
carriers. The FCC observed that the economies of trunk line circuits tended
to favor carrier operations. A volume customer when confronted with the
choice of owning his channels or leasing them would necessarily choose the
former because of these economies. Indeed, the FCC cited additional factors
countervailing the wholesale adoption of user-operated radio systems. In the
first place, investment in private microwave is of sufficient magnitude to deter
many users from getting into the communication business themselves.28 In
the second place, commercial entities, as indicated above, could not operate
cooperatively a microwave radio relay system. (Certain exceptions do exist
such as right-of-way companies.) 29 And finally, the FCC noted that the carriers
have prohibited the interconnection of customer-owned equipment to the car-
riers' toll and local telephone lines. Of course, if the bulk consumer elects to
take all of his communication requirements from the carrier industry, the
interconnection issue becomes nonexistent. Private lease subscribers are granted
access to telephone toll facilities automatically30 Thus, it is only when the
26. Above 890-Report, supra note 4, at 404-05.
27. In the Matter of an Inquiry into the Allocation of Frequency Bands for Space
Communications, FCC Docket No. 13522, 1960, p. 1.
28. Testimony of D. E. Noble on behalf of ELA, FCC Docket No. 11866, 1957, p. 18:
"A very liberal and open licensing policy for microwave communications systems is not
such a radical suggestion as it might seem to be at first glance. If microwave systems were
very low in cost and easy to maintain and operate, there might be some reason for concern
about the number of systems which would be activated under an open licensing policy.
Microwave systems are costly and the dollar discipline will limit the systems placed in
operation to those which will contribute substantially to the customer's business." See also
p. 19: "The cost of connecting two factories together by microwave over a distance of 250
to 300 miles would be somewhere between $350 and $500,000, depending upon the systems,
the terrain and the reliability required. Such systems can pay off for the purchaser only if the
need for communications is great enough to utilize a substantial portion of the channel
capacity."
29. Above 890-Report, supra note 4, at 407-08: "We have carefully considered the
requests by some of the private users . . . to share frequencies on a cooperative, nonprofit
cost-sharing basis with similar users in the same service .... Accordingly, on the basis of the
record herein, it does not appear, at this time, that the public interest would be served by
generally authorizing such . . . arrangements for private point-to-point microwave systems.
Consequently, except for... organizations whose rates and charges are regulated by a gov-
ernmental entity, authorizations will not be issued for the cooperative use of private micro-
wave systems."
30. Above 890-Memo, supra note 7, at 837: "Noting the statements by the carriers.
that if policy determinations in the report and order are firm, it might be necessary for the
carriers to reevaluate their interconnection practices to determine what steps should be
taken for their self-preservation, it was stated that the carriers are thereby serving notice
that they intend to defeat or obstruct that policy by revising their interconnection practices
to impair the usefulness of private microwave systems."
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consumer chooses to provide his own communication system that he encounters
the obstacle of interconnection-an obstacle that clearly gives the advantage
to the leasing option. In a sense then, the Commission attempted to accommo-
date the opposing arguments on cost. It granted the existence of the potential
economies inherent in private microwave but observed that the economies asso-
ciated with carrier circuits would enable them to hold their private lease
customers.
The Commission is currently immersed in the third issue, namely, the effect
of private microwave upon the pricing policies of the common carriers. More
specifically, will the FCC permit the Bell System to counter the entry of
customer-owned systems with new competitive offerings? This problem arose
when AT&T innovated the Multiple Channel offering in an attempt to antici-
pate market rivalry in the mid-1950's. This tariff contemplated a rate reduction
of up to 28 per cent to certain volume users of leased channels.31 Following the
FCC's Above 890 decision, however, Bell introduced additional private line
offerings among which are WATS (Wide Area Telephone Service), WADS
(Wide Area Data Service) and TELPAK.
Of these tariffs, TELPAK particularly is surrounded by controversy.3 2
This offering specifies the leasing of different groups of channels ranging in
increasing size from TELPAK A through TELPAK D. These channels may be
employed by the subscriber for a variety of uses ranging from voice to data.
33
More importantly TELPAK represents a substantial reduction in communica-
tion prices when compared with former private-line rates. (The Bell System
denies that such a comparison is valid because TELPAK represents a new and
distinctive service to its customers). AT&T insists that the tariff is justified by
the competitive nature of the private lease market. It has invoked the incre-
mental pricing standard of rate making in defending it (pricing below full
cost).
34
The Commission thus far has been less than sympathetic to both the Multi-
ple Channel and the TELPAK tariff. It concluded in the Multiple Channel
case that the reduction accorded volume users was not justified by comparable
reductions in the cost of rendering service to those customers.35 Indeed, the
31. In the Matter of AT&T Charges, Classification, Regulation and Practices for an
Interconnection with Private Line Services and Channels, FCC Docket No. 11645, p. 77.
(Initial Decision). (Hereinafter cited as Private Line Docket.)
32. Bell System Exhibit No. 5, testimony of Richard B. Holt, TELPAK Docket supra
note 20, at 3.
33. Id. at 14, Motorola testimony. Motorola claims the reduction in some cases is over
80%.
34. "Thus the determination of the costs of a competitive offering under an incremental
or additional cost basis has long been recognized as proper. Competitive rates are com-
pensatory and do not place an undue burden on the users of a carrier service if the rates
cover incremental costs." TELPAK Docket, supra note 20, at 41. Brief and Proposed Findings
and Conclusions of Bell System Respondents. Also, the Bell System submitted to the Docket
articles by Baumol, Cost in the Minimum Pricing of Railroad Services, 35 journal of Busi-
ness 366 (1962).
35. Private Line Docket, supra note 31, at 77, "There are no significant references
in the carrier's cost in furnishing a multiple number of channels to a single distance between
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Commission ruled that this tariff would result in price discrimination against
those private lease users not eligible for the price discount.
The FCC has been critical of the TELPAK offering as well. The Commis-
sion has declared in a tentative decision that certain groupings of TELPAK,
A and B, are not validated by the necessity of meeting private microwave
competition. Moreover, other TELPAK groups (TELPAK's C and D) are priced
so as to earn less than a compensatory rate of return.80 By casting a jaundiced
eye on competitive pricing techniques of the Bell System, these decisions had
tended again to favor the private microwave option.
Finally, what policy implications can be read into competition in the
equipment market? It is important to note that rivalry in this field resides
between the integrated subsidiary on the one side and the non-integrated sup-
plier on the other. In loosening the rationing of microwave frequencies, the
Commission indirectly favored the independent supplier of communication
hardware. Indeed, the FCC was not entirely unaware of the competitive over-
tones of its policy for it observed that private microwave would ". . . afford
a competitive spur in the manufacturing and development of the communica-
tion art."1
37
If the Commission's decisions in the frequency case implicitly counter the
economies of integration defended by the carriers, then a recent decision by
the Department of Justice has added support to this thesis. The Department
has initiated a suit to block the acquisition by General Telephone and Elec-
tronics of several independent companies on the West Coast. The Department
contends that this merger will tend to foreclose the equipment market to
independent suppliers or,
Competition in the furnishing of telephone service and manufacturing
distribution and sales of products used in the furnishing of such serv-
ices may be decreased to the detriment of actual and potential com-
petition.88
Thus, an overview of public policy in the communication industry suggests
that the competitive entry of private microwave has been treated favorably.
a given pair of points as compared with the furnishing of the same number of channels to
different customers between the same given points."
36. TELPAK Docket, supra note 20, at 30: "AT&T has not justified the discrimination
in charges in like communication services found to exist between TELPAK communications
on the one hand and the ordinary private line classifications on the other hand."
37. Above 890-Report, supra note 4, at 414; see also Above 890-Memo, supra note 7,
at 854: "We stated that the liberalizing licensing policy would provide impetus in the
manufacturing of communication equipment which in turn would result in improvements in
the communication art. The evidence in the records shows that the manufacturers of micro-
wave equipment for private users have been reluctant in the past to develop microwave
equipment to any substantial extent due to the fact that the licensing of private microwave
systems has been on a developmental basis except in the aviation service. With the opening
of a new market for microwave equipment it seems clear that a resultant competitive situa-
tion among manufacturers would provide the incentive for developing better equipment for
meeting the needs of private users and concomitant improvement in the communication art."
38. See United States v. Gen. Tel. & Electronics Corp., Civ. 1912 (S.D.N.Y. June 19,
1964)' 8.
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On the issue of frequency we have seen that the FCCs decision to unfreeze
the microwave bands has tended to sponsor rivalry even though customers may
not share the ownership of private microwave. On the issue of cost, the Com-
mission has not denied the economies inherent in the volume of trunk service
of the carriers but rather has asserted that these economies may not necessarily
be rescinded by the adoption of private microwave. On the issue of carrier
pricing, the Commission has ruled unfavorably on two recent attempts by
AT&T to invoke competitive tariffs. Both the Multiple Channel decision as
well as the TELPAK tentative decision indicate that the Commission thus far
at least finds little merit in the pricing rationale put forth by the telephone
company. And as to the final issue of equipment market competition, the
trend does appear to support the position that competition is a viable
environment in the equipment market.
One could conclude in view of this evidence that public policy will lead to
greater competition in both the bulk message and the communication equip-
ment markets. The difficulty with such a conclusion is that it fails to consider
two additional factors that seriously counteract the substance of these determi-
nations. These pending issues include first, the procedural delay in recent tariff
rate hearings before the FCC and second, the fundamental industry structure
of the common carriers, namely their vertical relationship.
V. PENDING IssuEs
Protracted Litigation
The Bell System has testified that the timing of its TELPAK offering is
an outgrowth of private microwave rivalry, a direct reaction to the FCC's
Above 890 decision. Since its introduction in 1961, customers in the bulk
service have welcomed a service whose rates in some cases represent a reduction
of 80 per cent of former charges. These rates are directed to a market in which
relatively few subscribers account for a major source of revenues. Western
Union, for example, estimates that some 50 per cent of its volume of private
line revenues flow from less than 5 per cent of its customers.3 9 That TELPAK
has effectively countered the private microwave option is evidenced by the
FCC's observation: "Only one major microwave system of the type involved
in the Above 890 decision is in effect."40
The problem posed by TELPAK is that as a tariff its legality awaits a
decision by both the FCC and the courts. (Bell has hinted that in the event
of an unfavorable decision by the Commission it will seek judicial review.) 4 '
The Commission's task of adjudication is by no means easy. On one side,
the Commission is faced with the argument that the offering is justified by
39. TELPAK Docket, supra note 20, at 16.
40. Id. at 15: "The large bulk communications users (which make up about 75% of the
revenues associated with commercial leased private line systems) require communications
systems that are far flung geographically."
41. 30 Telecommunications Rep. 1 (Sept. 14, 1964).
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new competition in the bulk market and is priced so as to earn a reasonable
rate of return. On the other side, opponents of the tariff (Western Union and
Motorola in particular) have alleged that TELPAK is a price discount that
unnecessarily discriminates between Bell's volume and non-volume customers.
Perhaps expediting the FCC's decision in this case would be less crucial if
the market impact of the tariff were suspended until the Commission could
issue a decision. However, the Communication Act of 1935 specifies that any
new service or change of existing service automatically takes effect following
a statutory prohibition period of ninety days.42 Here is the core of the TELPAK
dilemma. The tariff has long outrun its statutory prohibition period. AT&T
has been soliciting bulk customers since 1961, even though the legality of the
offering is unknown, undetermined and immersed in protracted adjudication.
The FCC is not unaware of the lag in its decision rendering process. In
attempting to reinstate the legality first and economic impact second, the
Commission has sought two reforms. It has requested that Congress amend
the Communication Act so that the withholding period be extended from a
period of three to nine months. It has also requested that the carrier intro-
ducing a new tariff assume the burden of justifying its cost. 43
The Bell System has testified in opposition to these changes. In the first
place, AT&T submits that it is unrealistic to assume that what the Commission
cannot complete in three months it can accomplish in nine. Bell also notes that
each of its three offerings, WADS, WATS, and TELPAK, has exceeded its
statutory prohibition period. Finally, the telephone carrier submits that ex-
tending the statutory period would pose a burden to the carrier for it would
deny to the carrier's private line subscribers new services that are priced at
lower costs. 4 4 .
In one sense the telephone carrier's position is valid. The FCC is un-
doubtedly optimistic in asking for a nine-month extension period. On the other
hand, the Bell position that any new offering take effect automatically in
ninety days because it benefits its customers assumes the very conclusion of
the litigation process-namely, that the new service is lawful. That such a
service may, in fact, discriminate is evident in the FCC's previous decisions
in the Multiple Channel case as well as a recent private line telegraph rate
case. Each offering was judged to be iriced below its cost of service.45 Some
commentators, in fact, have hinted that the TELPAK adjudication enables
the Bell System to purchase time in which to introduce low-cost transmission
facilities.
46
42. Federal Communications Act, 48 Stat. 1071-72 (1934), 47 U.S.C. 204 (1958).
43. Hearings on H.R. 80B Before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
Amendments to Title II of the Communications Act of 1934, Common Carriers, 88th Cong.,
2d Sess. 18-19 (1964).
44. Id. at 101-02. Testimony of George L. Best, Vice President, AT&T.
45. Private Line Docket, supra note 31, at 31.
46. Gardner, FCC Rules Temporary O.K. for AT&T's Telpak, 9 Control Engineering
27 (1962): "Even if the FCC eventually decides that AT&T can offer TELPAK rates with
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Several innovations can be considered in addressing ourselves to the prob-
lem of protracted rate-making proceedings. For example, all new or reduced
tariffs might be withheld from market effect until the tariffs' legality was
established. This suggestion would correlate the statutory freeze period directly
with the length of the adjudication period. Undoubtedly the carriers would
be unreceptive to this suggestion. It would tend to penalize them for whatever
inefficiency resided within the Commission's proceedings. On the other hand,
the freeze would redress the problem where market reality outruns the legal
status of carrier rates.
A second suggestion is to re-examine the assumptions governing the ad-
judicatory process itself. The precise nature of these changes must await the
recommendations of the President's Administrative Conference. 47 In any event,
some action is needed to expedite rate-making decisions and to reduce the
rising backlog of cases in the FCC's Common Carrier Division.48 (The Inter-
state Commerce Commission has recently let a contract to study expediting
its decisions.)
49
Over and above internal reforms, a final recommendation is to strengthen
the staff and resources of the Common Carrier Division. The growth of the
book assets of the domestic common carriers has far exceeded the relative
increase in the budget of the Common Carrier Division. ° Indeed a study by
the Bureau of the Budget reported that the staff of the Common Carrier Divi-
sion was entirely inadequate to meet its statutory obligations.51 In short, the
issue is not Big Government shackling the energies of the enterprise system,
but rather private governments stifling the very substance and intent of the law.
diversed facilities, the companies will have had time to replace the diverse facilities with
special TELPAK facilities. The customers gain with diverse channels would then be charged
whatever the FCC finally decided were proper rates for TELPAK." Furthermore, John H.
Waters, Western Union's Attorney said, "We are building a private microwave system it is
true, but by the time this microwave system is built, AT&T will have acquired all the
large users. See also Letter From Walter P. Marshall, President, Western Union Telegraph
Company to Newton Minnow, October 5, 1961 in TELPAK Docket, supra note 20: "I submit
that the situation is so grave and potential damage is so serious that the mere utilization of
existing procedure for the orderly disposition of questions which arise from the founding of
the tariff will not suffice. If the Commission should now do nothing other than to follow
the statutory procedures described for the determination of the lawfulness of the individual
tariffs in the very passage of time the apparent end or arriving at such determinations will
have brought about an accomplished fact-a virtual complete telecommunications monopoly
by the telephone company-before the Commission has had sufficient time to adjudicate the
serious issues involved."
47. Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Committee on the
Judiciary, Administrative Practice and Procedure, S. Rep. No. 929, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 4
(1964).
48. Statistical Data Related to Administrative Proceedings Conducted by Federal
Agencies, 1963, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 28-29 (1964). (Committee Print prepared for the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure.)
49. N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1964, p. 68C, col. 7.
50. Antitrust Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, Consent
Decree Program of the Department of Justice, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
51. Booz, Allen & Hamilton, Organization and Management Survey of the Federal




If the carriers' pricing response to market entry is a common theme in
the adjudicatory problem then it is relevant to competition in the equipment
market as well. TELPAK tends to hold the bulk customer to the leasing option;
indeed given its purported economies, the bulk consumer would be foolish not
to avail himself of these savings. Necessarily the decision to lease circuits re-
enforces the market position of the affiliated supplier. It is in this sense that the
decision to rent communication channels also tends to foreclose diversity in the
manufacturing of communication apparatus. Thus, whether TELPAK is de-
termined to be legitimate or illegitimate as a service, competition in the com-
munication equipment market still remains an unanswered policy question.
A detailed history of the vertical relationship of the common carriers is
beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to note that the relationship was
crystallized by a consent judgment entered into by the Bell System and the
Department of Justice. This decree has been a center of controversy and con-
gressional investigation. 2 Much of the notoriety surrounding the judgment
was traced to the original position of the government-namely to require AT&T
to divest itself of Western Electric. But of more interest is the current ambiv-
alence of the Department of Justice toward competition in this market. The
Department supported the FCC's decision on the microwave frequency case
and indirectly aided and abetted the position of the independent supplier. The
Department has also anticipated General Telephone's attempt to integrate for-
ward. On the question of the existing vertical relationship of both the Bell and
the General Telephone System, however, policy has been discreetly silent.
If, for policy reasons, a direct confrontation of the vertical integration
problem is to be avoided, decisions originating in the public sector could,
nonetheless, serve to circumvent and dilute the market power of the integrated
supplier. To document the frustration of the indirect approach it is necessary to
recall that the government is a major consumer of bulk communications. It, too,
is posed with the choice of leasing carrier circuits or operating private micro-
wave. As a matter of fact, prior to the TELPAK offering, the General Service
Administration as well as other agencies did attempt to exploit the economies
of radio relay operations. This route was effectively impeded by a directive from
the Bureau of the Budget in 1959. The directive stated that in weighing the
option between buying from outside sources and purchasing inside services the
cost of outside sources should not be regarded as paramount. To quote the
Bureau of the Budget:
It may be found to be in the public interest to purchase the product
and service regardless of the cost factors in order to foster or maintain
the development or growth of commercial production capacity to meet
52. Hearings before the Antitrust Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on the
Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958). See also United States v. Western Elec. Co., Civ. 17-49
(D.N.J. Jan. 14, 1949).
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alternate government and non-government needs at potentially lower
costs.
5 3
It is an open secret that the communications carriers actively lobbied for
this directive.
Conceivably, government procurement policy could have been employed as
one vehicle in broadening the market opportunities of the nonaffiliated supplier
of communication apparatus. The failure of the indirect approach, then, rests
upon the refusal to identify vertical integration as the obstacle to competition
in the equipment field. One must necessarily onclude that the fundamental
barrier to competition in the hardware market is the utility-supplier complex,
and it is this relationship that deserves first priority in public policy.
This paper has attempted to document the frustration of pursuing a policy
of even limited oligopoly in both the communication message market and the
communication equipment market. Despite the FCC's favorable treatment of
private microwave on the basis of frequency, costing, carrier tariffs, and the
equipment field, the common carrier industry remains practically impervious
to these decisions. It is incumbent as a limited first step, that the Commission's
adjudicatory procedure must be overhauled, and as a second step, that no
carrier continue to hold ownership in manufacturing activities.
53. Bureau of the Budget Bulletin No. 60-2, p. 3, Sept. 21, 1959.
